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"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE: PART II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This the second of two articles on the admissibility of 
"other acts" evidence under Ohio Rule 404(8). Typically, 
other-acts evidence is admitted as proof of one of four es-
sential elements: (1) to show that the accused was the 
actor (identity issue); (2) to show that the accused pos-
sessed the requisite mental state (mens rea issue); (3) to 
show that a crime was committed (actus reus or corpus 
delicti issue); and (4) to show the victim's state of mind in 
those rare crimes where that is an element of the charged 
offense. In addition, it is sometimes impossible to separate 
the charged offense and the other-act. This is often referred 
to as "interrelated" acts or res gestae. Finally, the entrap-
ment defense raises further issues. See generally 1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence § 
404.11 (1996). 
PROOF OF IDENTITY 
The identity of the person who committed the charged of-
fense is always an essential element of a crime, and there-
fore always constitutes a material or consequential fact. 
"Identity" is specifically listed in Rule 404(8). See State v. 
Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527,530,634 N.E.2d 616 (1994) 
("[W]e therefore must be careful when considering evidence 
as proof of identity to recognize the distinction between evi-
dence which shows that a defendant is the type of person 
who might commit a particular crime and evidence which 
shows that a defendant is the person who committed a par-
ticular crime."). See also 1 lmwinkelried, Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence Ch 3 (1999). 
Moreover, several of the listed "purposes" specified in 
Rule 404(8), such as motive, opportunity, or preparation, 
may be relevant to prove identity. Other-acts evidence may 
show identity in a number of ways. For example: 
(1) In a murder case, evidence of the defendant's af-
fair with the victim's wife (the other-act) may be admis-
sible to establish motive, and motive is probative of 
identity. See also State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 
441,709 N.E.2d 140 (1999)("Defendant's beating [his 
former girlfriend] tends to show his jealousy and result-
ing rage toward her, emotions that gave defendant a 
strong motive to kill her mother and boyfriend:'), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 938 (1999); State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 193, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998)("[The defen-
dant] was charged with committing the murder for hire. 
Accordingly, evidence concerning prior acts performed 
for [the person who allegedly hired him to commit the 
murder] is admissible to prove motive under Evid.R. 
404(8)."), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1042 (1999); State v. 
Henness, 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 61, 679 N.E.2d 686 
(1997)("Appellant's drug addiction and use shows his 
need for money and, hence, his motive to steal and 
kill."), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997); State v. 
Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 339, 652 N.E.2d 1000 
(1995)(The prosecution introduced evidence that the 
defendant had previously raped the victim and fa-
thered her child. ''This was highly relevant on the issue 
of [defendant's] motive to murder in order to escape 
punishment for the rape offense. The evidence was 
not offered to demonstrate [defendant's] propensity to 
commit crimes,"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1095 (1996). 
(2) In a murder case, in which the victim was killed by 
a bomb, evidence that the defendant had used a bomb 
in a prior offense may be admissible to establish the 
defendant's technical know-how with explosives, and 
this capacity (opportunity) is probative of identity. 
(3) In a bank robbery case, evidence that the defen-
dant had previously stolen a car that was later identi-
fied as the robbery getaway car may be admissible to 
establish preparation and is probative of identity. 
(4) In a murder case, evidence that the defendant par-
ticipated in a prior robbery in which a weapon was 
stolen may be admissible to prove identity if the same 
weapon is found at the murder scene. E.g., State v. 
Watson, 28 Ohio St.2d 15, 21-22, 275 N.E.2d 153 
(1971) ("Thus where ... the state is required to show 
possession of the weapon by defendant it is permissi-
ble to allow in evidence proof of other crimes tending 
to prove such possession, even though such evidence 
involves proof of crimes other than the one with which 
the defendant is charged:'). 
(5) In a robbery case, evidence that the defendant 
used the victim's credit cards may be admissible to 
connect the defendant to the robbery. See State v. 
Chief Public Defender James A Draper Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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Henness, 79 Ohio St.3d 53; 61, 679 N.E.2d 686 
(1997)(defendant's "use of stolen checks and credit 
cards shows he possessed [the victim's] property the 
day after [the victim] disappeared, proving robbery and 
linking [the defendant] to [the victim's] death"), cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997). 
(6) "Evidence of intimidation of witnesses or attempts 
at suppression of adverse evidence reflects a con-
sciousness of guilt and is not wholly independent of 
the charged offenses. These acts are admissions by 
conduct and are admissible to prove identity because 
they directly tie the defendant to the criminal act." State 
v. Hirsch, 129 Ohio App.3d 294, 306-07, 717 N.E.2d 
789 (1998), appeal dismissed, 84 Ohio St.3d 1436, 
702 N.E.2d 1213 (1998). 
Other illustrations are found in the cases. E.g., State v. 
McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 442, 700 N.E.2d 596 (1998) 
(other-acts evidence of drug sales admissible to corroborate 
eyewitness identification of the defendant as the shooter in 
a murder involving a drug dispute), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 
1137 (1999); State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 338, 581 
N.E.2d 1362 (1991)(Where accused claims alibi, evidence 
concerning his narcotics activities to show why he would 
travel to the scene of the crime is admissible.), cert. dis-
missed, 506 U.S. 803 (1992); State v. Daniels, 92 Ohio 
App.3d 473, 492, 636 N.E.2d 336 (1993)(''The state's case 
centered on the theory that Jackson conspired to kill Foster 
to prevent him from testifying against Jackson with respect 
to the assault on Foster."), appeal dismissed, 68 Ohio St.3d 
1449, 626 N.E.2d 690 (1994). 
In State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 653 N.E.2d 675 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178 (1996), the prosecution 
introduced evidence that the victim participated in her 
church's prison ministry program and that she met the de-
fendant through that program while he was incarcerated. 
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the admission of the evi-
dence: "Evid.R. 404(B) allows 'other acts' evidence as proof 
of identity. Since [the victim] was apparently killed by some-
one she knew, the prior-imprisonment evidence was rele-
vant to explain that [the victim] knew [the defendant] through 
visiting him in prison." ld. at 632. 
Proof of identity: Modus operandi 
Evidence of similarity between the other-act and the 
crime charged is frequently offered to prove identity- i.e., 
the modus operandi of both crimes is so similar that the 
same person probably committed both offenses - provided 
sufficient evidence is admitted to show that the defendant 
committed the other-act. This theory of admissibility long 
predated Rule 404(B). E.g., State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 
73, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975) ("similar crimes within a period 
of time reasonably near to the offense on trial, [and show-
ing] that a similar scheme, plan or system was utilized to 
commit both the offense at issue and the other crimes"); 
Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 NE 51 (1928) 
(other robberies by defendants wearing uniforms, imperson-
ating officers, and stopping cars "earmarked" them as the 
perpetrators of the offense charged); Barnett v. State, 1 04 
Ohio St. 298, 303, 135 NE 647 (1922) ("If the fact tends to 
establish the identity of the accused, it is competent evi-
dence, no matter what else it may prove:'). 
The commission of two robberies with a weapon, howev-
er, does not satisfy the minimum relevancy standard. 
According to McCormick, "the mere repeated commission of 
crimes of the same class, such as repeated murders, rob-
2 
beries or rapes" is insufficient; the "pattern and characteris-
tics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to 
be like a signature." 1 McCormick, Evidence § 190, at 662-
63 (5th ed. 1999). See also United States v. Luna, 21 F.3d 
874, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (generic "takeover'' bank robberies 
not sufficiently distinctive); People v. Haston, 69 Cal.2d 233, 
245, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427, 444 P.2d 91, 99 (1968) ("It is 
apparent that the indicated inference does not arise ... from 
the mere fact that the charged and uncharged offenses 
share certain marks of similarity, for it may be that the 
marks in question are of such common occurrence that they 
are~hared not only by the charged crime and defendant's 
prior offenses, but also by numerous other crimes commit-
ted_ by persons other than defendant."). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has addressed this topic nu-
merous times. Other-acts evidence, for example, to prove 
''the identity of the perpetrator is admissible where two 
deaths occur under almost identical circumstances." State v. 
Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d"137, 142, 551 N.E.2d 190 (1990) (ac-
cused charged with murder by administering an overdose of 
morphine to an overnight guest; evidence that another 
overnight guest also died from a morphine overdose admit-
ted). See also State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 370, 738 
N.E.2d 1208 (2000) (''the offenses against Moore showed a 
'unique, identifiable plan of criminal activity' helping to prove 
Green's identity as one who kidnapped, robbed, and killed 
EI-Okdi."); State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 490, 709 N.E.2d 
484 (1999)("[T]he 'other act' evidence established a 'behav-
ioral fingerprint' linking the [defendant] to the [other] crime 
due to the common features shared by the [prior] homicide 
and the [present] homicide. The deaths of [the two victims] 
occurred under practically identical circumstances."), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S.1 049 (1999); State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 366, 662 N.E.2d 311 (1996)("[T]here are 'striking' 
similarities between appellant's 1985 [aggravated burglary] 
conviction and the aggravated burglary in the case at bar."), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 895 (1996); State v. Woodard, 68 
Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 623 N.E.2d 75 (1993)(evidence of anoth-
er car-jacking on the same night admissible to prove identi-
ty), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246 (1994); State v. Hill, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 313, 323, 595 N.E.2d 884 (1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 1007 (1993); State v. Shedrick, 61 Ohio St. 3d 331, 338, 
574 N.E.2d 1065 (1991) (similarities between two rapes suf-
ficient to show identity); State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 
182, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990)(accused charged with robbery-
murder in downtown Cincinnati; evidence of seven other 
robberies by accused over·a four-month span in downtown 
Cincinnati with many similar qualities admitted), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 
167, 177,249 N.E.2d 912 (1969) (''There must be some 
similarity of methodology employed which itself would con-
stitute probative evidence of the probability that the same 
person ... committed both crimes."); State v. Pearson, 119 
Ohio App.3d 7 45, 758, 696 N.E.2d 273 (1997)(''The details 
of all three attacks were strikingly similar."), appeal dis-
missed, 80 Ohio St.3d 1410,684 N.E.2d 703 (1997). 
In another case, the Court identified the following similari-
ties: 
[T]he Wilson and Jackson crimes share a similar 
modus operandi with the murder. In each case, Waddy 
entered a woman's apartment at night; he bound the 
victim's wrists behind her back and tied her ankles; he 
used a knife; he called each victim a "bitch"; he took 
the victim's car or car keys; and he stole or demanded 
bank cards or credit cards. The crimes occurred with-
in a three-month period and within walking distance of 
each other. Waddy points out that the crimes differ in 
some ways; however, such differences go to weight, 
not admissibility. State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 
429, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 921 (1992). 
See also State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 292, 525 
N.E.2d 792 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988) 
("[S]imilarities in the crimes indicate there is a strong likeli-
hood that the offender in the solved crime also committed 
the unsolved crime."); State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 11, 
679 N.E.2d 646 (1997)(the evidence of modus operandi "es-
tablished a 'behavioral fingerprint' linking the appellant to the 
crime due to the common features shared by both events"), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053 (1998); State v. Echols, 128 
Ohio App.3d 677, 693, 716 N.E.2d 728 (1998). 
Waddy involved a joinder issue. See 2 Katz & Giannelli, 
Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law Ch 57 (1996)Goinder 
& severance of offenses). If evidence of crimes in the other 
counts of an indictment are admissible under Evid. R. 
404(B), the argument for severance of offenses under 
Criminal Rule 14 is undercut. See State v. Echols, 128 Ohio 
App.3d 677, 692, 716 N.E.2d 728 (1998) ("In this case, the 
trial court arguably allowed joinder because the evidence of 
the various incidents ('other acts') would be admissible in 
any one case to prove identity."). 
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also ruled evi-
dence inadmissible on this basis: 
[T]he acts should show a modus operandi identifiable 
with the defendant. ... A certain modus operandi is ad-
missible ... because it provides a behavioral fingerprint 
which, when compared to the behavioral fingerprints 
associated with the crime in question, can be used to 
identify the defendant as the perpetrator .... To be ad-
missible to prove identity through a certain modus 
operandi, other-acts evidence must be related to and 
share common features with the crime in question. 
State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 531-32, 634 N.E.2d 
616 (1994)("The only arguably common feature ... is 
the use of rope .... The use of rope itself does not pro~ 
vide a distinctive behavioral fingerprint."). 
Accord State v. Echols, 128 App.3d 677,693, 716 N.E.2d 
728 (1998) ("Very seldom is evidence of different crimes 
sufficiently similar to be a behavioral fingerprint. . .. [l]n this 
case, we conclude that all the joined offenses did not share 
'significant common features' sufficient to establish a modus 
operandi. Although the crimes occurred in the same geo-
graphical area at knifepoint, there was a great deal of vari-
ance among the robberies.") (footnotes omitted). 
See also State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 
912 (1969) (reversing conviction because evidence of an-
other robbery-murder improperly admitted); State v. Hall, 57 
Ohio App.3d 144, 148, 567 N.E.2d 305 (1989)(other act "not 
sufficiently distinctive to demonstrate the identity of the per-
petrator''), appeal dismissed, 42 Ohio St.3d 714, 538 N.E.2d 
1065 (1989); State v. Smith, 59 Ohio App.2d 194, 202, 392 
N.E.2d 1264 (1977) ("There was no uniformity in the titne of 
day of the other acts, the method of entry, or the items 
taken."). 
As explained in Part I, identifying the material issue, such 
as identity, is only the first step in determining admissibility. 
The evidence is still subject to exclusion under Rule 403. 
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PROOF OF MENS REA 
Intent & knowledge 
Other-acts evidence is often used to show that the ac-
cused possessed the requisite mental state for the charged 
offense, i.e., to establish the mens rea. See 1 lmwinkelried, 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Ch 5 (1999). Two of the 
listed "purposes" in Rule 404(B) - intent and knowledge -
frequently are mens rea elements of crimes, and other-acts 
evidence may be used to prove these mental states. See 
R.C. 2901.22 (culpable mental states include conduct done 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently). 
Motive and preparation, which are also listed, may relate 
to these elements. For example, a defendant's illicit affair 
with a homicide victim's wife is an other-act which tends to 
show "motive," and a person with a motive is more likely to 
have intentionally killed than a person without a motive. 
Similarly, evidence that the defendant stole a gun the day 
before a homicide may show preparation, and thus is proba-
tive of "calculation and design" in an aggravated homicide 
case. See also State v. Allard, 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 501 , 663 
N.E.2d 1277 (1996)(holding that testimony of witnesses 
about threatening statements made by the defendant before 
the murders "was clearly offered to demonstrate the ele-
ment of prior calculation and design"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1031 (1996). 
Numerous other examples illustrate the rule. E.g., State 
v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 140, 707 N.E.2d 476 
(1999)("R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) requires that the state prove mo-
tive ["purpose"], and evidence was introduced to demon-
strate that Stevens was the key witness against appellant 
and that her murder would hinder the state's case against 
him by preventing her testimony, which explained appellant's 
motive and deep obsession with killing Stevens. Thus, the 
drug sales were not considered 'other acts' evidence limited 
by Evid.R. 404(B); rather, they were introduced to prove ... 
the death-penalty specification."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954 
(1999); State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 339, 652 N.E.2d 
1000 (1995)(The prosecution introduced evidence that the 
defendant had previously raped the victim and fathered her 
child. "This was highly relevant on the issue of [defendant's] 
motive to murder in order to escape punishment for the rape 
offense. The evidence was not offered to demonstrate [de-
fendant's] propensity to commit crimes."), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 1095 (1996); State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 606, 
605 N.E.2d 916 (1992) ("Appellant's prior break-ins were 
relevant under Evid. R. 404(8) to his motive and intent in en-
tering [the victim's] house."), cert. denied, 510 U:S. 833 
(1993); State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d 137, 142, 551 N.E.2d 
190 (1990) ("evidence of 'other acts' to prove intent to com-
mit a crime"); State v. Greer, 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 420 N.E.2d 
982 (1981); State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 
337 (1979); State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 285 
N.E.2d 726 (1972); State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 
N.E.2d 365 (1948); State v. Haddix, 93 Ohio App.3d 470, 
481, 638 N.E.2d 1096 (1994) (Evidence of other stolen 
items admissible to show knowledge because "[f]rom the 
outset, appellant has denied being involved in fencing stolen 
property or receiving stolen property."). 
Lack of mistake or accident 
The defenses of mistake and accident also relate to 
mens rea. Neither is an affirmative defense; both involve a 
claim that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea of 
the charged offense. See 3 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's 
Ohio Practice, Criminal Law§ 91.8 (1996). An "absence of 
mistake or accident" is "not a separate category but merely 
a converse of the existence of a specific intent." State v. 
Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 7, 12, 359 N.E.2d 87 (1976}. See 
also Ohio Jury Instructions § 411.01. 
For example, a defendant charged with murder who testi-
fies that the weapon discharged "accidently" because he 
was unfamiliar with firearms is raising a defense of accident, 
which tends to negate the mens rea element of purposeful-
ness. See R.C. 2903.02(A) (defining murder as purposely 
causing the death of another). To rebut this claim, evidence 
that the defendant had used a weapon during a prior rob-
bery may be admissible. Similarly, a defendant who claims 
she made a mistake about the nature of a controlled sub-
stance is asserting a lack of mens rea, i.e., knowledge that 
the substance was heroin. Accordingly, her prior heroin 
transactions may be admissible to show that she is familiar 
with heroin and thus a "mistake" is unlikely. 
See also State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 471, 620 
N.E.2d 50 (1993}("The existence of these basement fires, 
not caused by the bedroom fire, tended to prove arson up-
stairs and negate the possibility of accident. Moreover, 
these basement fires tended to show a common plan or 
scheme and identify Grant as the arsonist."), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 836 (1994); State v. Grubb; 111 Ohio App.3d 277, 
282, 675 N.E.2d 1353 (1996) (Defendant's "testimony also 
raised an issue regarding whether his wife's injuries were 
'accidental' and not the result of any intentional (or knowing) 
conduct on his part. To that extent 'intent' and 'lack of acci-
dent' ... were in issue in this case. Accordingly, the state 
was entitled to utilize the evidence regarding defendant's 
assaults on his former wife pursuant to Evid.R. 404(8) ... to 
prove his intent (culpable mental state) and the lack of acci-
dent,- in this case:"); State v. McCornell, 91 Ohio App.3d 141, 
147, 631 N.E.2d 1110 (1993)("The two serious physical in-
juries caused by appellant to [his wife] and her stories about 
them [being accidental] are too coincidental to be left un-
challenged by the state."). 
Evidence of absence of mistake or accident is typically 
admitted in rebuttal rather than ih the prosecution's case-in-
chief because the issue is otter) raised for the first time dur-
ing the defense's case-in-chief. E.g., State v. Davis, 81 Ohio 
App.3d 706,717,612 N.E.2d 343 (1992) ("It is apparent 
that for some of the purposes for admitting evidence of 
other acts, as set forth in Evid. R. 404(8) and R.C. 2945.59 
(e.g., 'absence of mistake or accident'), it is more appropri-
ate that such evidence be presented in rebuttal after the de-
fendant has asserted a defense (e.g., mistake or accident). 
However, we do not find that to be true in all cases."); State 
v. Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 7, 15-16, 359 N.E.2d 87 
(1976). 
In State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 159, 311 N.E.2d 
526 (1974), the Ohio Supreme Court commented: 
The other acts of the defendant must have such a tem-
poral, modal and situational relationship with the acts 
constituting the crime charged that evidence of the 
other acts discloses purposeful action in the commis-
sion of the off~nse in question. The evidence is then 
admissible to the extent it may be relevant in showing 
the defendant acted in the absence of mistake or acci-
dent. The accident issue, of course, could be raised 
by the defense during opening statements or through 
the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, in 
which case the prosecution should be permitted to in-
troduce this type of evidence in its case-in-chief. 
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In general, however, the prosecution should not be permit-
ted to introduce other-acts evidence to prove lack of mistake 
or accident unless mistake or accident is somehow raised 
by the defendant. See State v. Blonski, 125 Ohio App.3d 
103, 112, 707 N.E.2d 1168 (1997)("Because there was no 
claim of accident or mistake to refute, the evidence of [the 
defendant's] prior acts of domestic violence should not have 
been admitted on that basis."), appeal dismissed, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 1521, 692 N.E.2d 1023 (1998}. 
As explained in Part I, identifying the material issue, such 
as mens rea, is only the first step in determining admissibili-
ty. The evidence is still subject to exclusion under Rule 403. 
PROOF OF CORPUS DELICTI 
Although not as common as the identity and mens rea 
examples cited above, other-acts evidence may be used to 
show that a crime has been committed, i.e., to establish the 
corpus delicti or actus reus of the crime. See 1 
lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Ch 4 (1999) 
(actus reus). 
The famous "Brides in the Bath" case, Rex v. Smith, 11 
Grim. App. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915}, illustrates this use. 
The defendant Was accused of murdering his wife, who had 
been found drowned in a bath tub. The prosecution intro-
duced evidence showing that two other wives had also 
drowned while taking baths. The evidence was relevant to 
show that the death in the charged offense was homicidal 
and not accidental. 
A similar issue arose in United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 
127, 133 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974), 
where the defendant was charged with the murder of an 
adopted child. A critical issue was whether the death was 
homicidal or natural. The prosecution offered evidence 
showing that nine other young children had died or been 
hospitalized while in the defendant's care. The court wrote: 
"Thus, with regard to no single child was there any legally 
sufficient proof that defendant has done any act which the 
law forbids. Only when all of the evidence concerning the 
nine other children and Paul is considered collectively is the 
conclusion impelled that the probability that some or all of 
the other deaths, cyanotic seizures, and respiratory defi-
ciencies were accidental or attributable to natural causes 
was so remote, the truth must be that Paul and some or all 
of the other children died at the hands of the defendant." 
Perhaps these examples could be classified as "absence 
of accident" cases. As discussed in the preceding section, 
however, evidence showing an absence of mistake or acci-
dent is admissible to refute a defendant's claim of lack of 
mens rea. As such, the evidence typically should be admit-
ted in rebuttal. The "Brides in the Bath" and Woods cases 
are different. The other-acts evidence had to be introduced 
in the prosecution's case-in-chief to prove that a crime had 
been committed. Otherwise, the case could have been ter-
minated by a directed verdict for the defense. See Grim. R. 
29(A)(motion for judgment of acquittal}. 
As explained in Part I, identifying the material issue, such 
as corpus delicti, is only the firststep in determining admis-
sibility. The evidence is still subject to exclusion under Rule 
403. 
VICTIM'S MENTAL STATE 
There are a few crimes, such as domestic violence, that 
make the victim's state of mind an essential element of the 
offense and other-acts may be relevant for this purpose. For 
example, in State v. Collie, 1 08 Ohio App.3d 580, 671 
N.E.2d 338 (1996}, the defendant was charged with domes-
tic violence under R.C. 291 9.25(C), which prohibits a person 
from "knowingly caus[ing] a family or household member to 
believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm 
to the family or household member." The court of appeals in 
Collie held that, "in order to prove the element of the belief 
of a family member that the offender will cause imminent 
physical harm, evidence of 'other acts' against the same vic-
tim will be admissible." ld. at 584. 
See also State v. Drake, 135 Ohio App.3d 507, 510, 734 
N.E.2d 865 (1 999} (''The act of previously putting Eva 
Drake's arm in a cast is admissible to show Eva Drake's 
state of mind when appellant made the threats in this case. 
The second statement also goes to Eva Drake's state 'of 
mind. The third statement is directly relevant to the threat to 
put Eva Drake in the river. These two previous threatening 
statements and one prior act are not generalized bad acts 
from appellant's past:'); State v. Renner, 125 Ohio App.3d 
383, 708 N.E.2d 765 (1 998} (In a prosecution for abduction 
and assault, the victim was allowed to testify as to past acts 
of violence that the defendant committed against her ''to 
prove abduction, i.e., to show that while [the defendant] 
used no words of threat to make [the victim] get in the truck 
that evening, she felt threatened and complied because of 
the presence of the gun and because of the past events of 
violence, including a specific act of violence involving the 
gun."). 
INTERRELATED ACTS 
In some cases it is impossible to exclude evidence of 
other acts that are interwoven with the charged offense, 
even though such acts are not material to an essential ele-
ment of the charged offense.1 McCormick, Evidence § 190, 
at 660 (5th ed. 1 999} (One permissible purpose of other-
acts evidence is "[t]o complete the story of the crime on trial 
by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contempo-
raneous happenings."). 
In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720 
(1 975), the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that there are 
some "situations in which the 'other acts' form part of the im-
mediate background of the alleged act which forms the 
foundation of the crime charged in the indictment. In such 
cases, it would be virtually impossible to prove that the ac-
cu~ed committed the crime charged without also introducing 
evidence .of the other acts. To be admissible ... the 'other 
acts' testimony must concern events which are inextricably 
related to the alleged criminal act." 
See also State v. Brown-Austin, 1998 WL 516301 at *3, 
No.1 997CA00122 (5th Dist. Ct. App., Stark, 8-3-98) (evi-
dence of gang activity "is closely interwoven into the back-
ground and circumstances of this crime and therefore, is ad-
missible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B)"); State v. Johnson, 
1998 WL 549342, No.1 997CA00247 (5th Dist. Ct. App., 
Stark, 9-1-98} (defendant charged with kidnaping, robbery, 
and assault; evidence of defendant's involvement in drug ac-
tivity admissible because "it provided the context in which 
t~e crimes charged occurred" and "established how the par-
ties knew each other and the nature of their relationship"). 
Res Gestae 
This situation is sometimes described as evidence of "res 
gestae." See State v. Spears, 58 Ohio App.2d 11, 387 
N.E.2d 648 (1 978). This phrase often confuses more than 
helps. 1 McCormick, Evidence § 190, at ~60 (5th ed. 1 999) 
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(''The phrases 'same transaction' or, less happily, 'res ges-
tae' often are used to denote evidence introduced for this 
purpose."). The term "res gestae" is also misused in the 
hearsay context. 
Intrinsic Acts 
Some federal cases hold that this situation is not gov-
erned by Federal Rule 404(b} because the interrelated act 
is not an "other'' or "extrinsic" act; rather it is an "intrinsic" act 
and thus part of the charged crime. E.g., United States v. 
Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Williford, 764 F.2d 1493,1499 (11th Cir.1985); United 
States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 {11th Cir. 1983} 
("Evidence of criminal activity other than the charged of-
fen~e. is not considered extrinsic evidence within the pro-
scnptlon of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
[1] if it is an uncharged offense which arose out of the sa~e 
tra~s.action _or se:ies of_transactions as the charged offense, 
~2] 1f 1t was 1nextncably Intertwined with the evidence regard-
Ing the charged offense, or [3] if it is necessary to complete 
the story of the crime of trial.") (citations omitted}. But see 
United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(Rules 404(b) and 403 govern the admissibility of evidence 
of uncharged crimes that are inextricably interwoven with 
the charged offense). See also State v. Green, 117 Ohio 
App.3d 644, 654, 691 N.E.2d 316 (1996)(''The evidence 
concerning the automobile accident and subsequent con-
duct of appellant is 'an integral part of the immediate con-
text' of the armed robbery charge."), appeal dismissed, 78 
Ohio St.3d 1495, 678 N.E.2d 1231 (1997). 
Test for Admissibility 
Under any view, however, the critical issue remains the 
same: ''This rationale should be applied only when refer-
ence to the other crimes is essential to a coherent and intel-
ligible description of the offense at bar." 1 McCormick, 
Evidence§ 190, at 660 (5th ed. 1999}. 
. For examp_le, the Ohio Supreme Court, in addressing this 
~~sue, _has written: :'The state further argues that the rape is 
1nextncably relc;~ted to the murder. But it seems clear that 
the rape was not part of the 'immediate background' of the 
murder:· State v. Hutton, 53 Ohio St.3d 36, 40, 559 N.E.2d 
432 (1 ~90}. One court of appeals held that,"[f]or testimony 
regarding scheme, plan, or system to be admissible ... it 
must be 'inextricably related' to the crime and form the im-
mediate background that serves as a foundation of the 
crime." State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125, 133, 680 
N.E.2d 657 (1996). 
The Ninth Circuit has provided the following guidance: 
'There are generally two categories of cases in which we 
ha_ve con_cluded t~at 'other act' evidence is inextricably inter-
twined w1th the cnme with which the defendant is charged 
and therefore need not meet 'the requirements of Rule 
404(b). First, we have sometimes allowed evidence to be 
admitted because it constitutes a part of the transaction that 
serves as the basis for the criminal charge. .... Second, we 
have allowed 'other act' evidence to be admitted when it was 
necessary to do so in order to permit the prosecutor to offer 
a coherent and comprehensible story regarding the com-
mission of the crime; it is obviously necessary in certain 
cases for the government to explain either the circum-
stances under which particular evidence was obtained or 
the events surrounding the commission of the crime. This 
exception to R1,1le 404(b) is most often invoked in cases in 
which the defendant is charged with being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm." United States v. Viscarra-Martinez, 66 
F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir.1995). 
DEFENDANT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE "OTHER ACT" 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
only if such evidence is relevant to a material or consequen-
tial fact under Rule 401. At a minimum, the prosecution 
must offer evidence tending to show that the defendant 
committed the other act. Otherwise, the evidence is irrele-
vant. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 
(1988) ("In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is 
relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor."). Some 
common law courts had required "substantial proof" or 
"clear and convincing evidence" of the defendant's involve-
ment in the other.act. See 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 190, at 
670-71 (5th ed. 1999). 
Ohio Rule 
The pre-Rules Ohio cases used the "substantial proof" 
standard. E.g., State v. Dick, 27 Ohio St.2d 162, 271 N.E.2d 
797 (1971); State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 269 N.E2d 
115 (1971); Scott v. State, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 NE 19 
(1923). 
Cases decided under the Rules have continued to apply 
this requirement. E.g., State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 
530, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994); State v. Hill, 64 Ohio St.3d 
313, 323, 595 N.E.2d 884 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
1007 (1993); State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 338, 581 
N.E.2d 1362 (1991 )("The threshold criterion is whether the 
other acts evidence can show by substantial proof any of 
those things enumerated."), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 803 
(1992}; State v. Shedrick, 59 Ohio St.3d 146, 150, 572 
NE.2d 59(1991)i-Statev.Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 
552 N.E.2d 180 (1990)("0ther-acts evidence need be 
proved only by substantial proof, not proof beyond a reason-
able doubt."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); State v. 
Pearson, 119 Ohio App.3d 7 45, 757, 696 N. E.2d 273 
(1997)("1n the present case, substantial proof was offered to 
establish that the other acts were committed by appellant. 
That is, Jennifer N. was able to identify appellant as her at-
tacker; DNA evidence linked appellant to the attacks on 
Stacie S. and Theresa T."), appeal dismissed, 80 Ohio St.3d 
1410, 684 N.E.2d 703 (1997}. 
Federal Rule 
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), rejected 
the commo_n law approach. Instead, the Court, based on 
Federal Rule 1 04(b) adopted a prima facie evidence stan-
dard, a very lax standard. The Court explained: "In deter-
mining whether the Government has introduced sufficient 
evidence to meet Rule 1 04(b), the trial court neither weighs 
credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has 
proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the 
case and decides whether the jury could reasonabJy find the 
conditional fact- here, that the televisions were stolen - by 
a preponderance of the evidence." ld. at 690. 
DUE PROCESS 
Several courts have indicated that the improper use of 
other-acts evidence may violate due process. See 2 
lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Ch 10 
(1999} (constitutional restrictions). 
In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991 ), the United 
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States Supreme Court considered such a claim. McGuire 
was convicted of murdering his infant daughter. At trial two 
physicians testified that the infant was a battered child, a 
finding based on prior injuries, some of which were discov-
ered during the autopsy. McGuire argued that evidence of 
these prior injuries violated the rule prohibiting prior-crimes 
evidence. The Court disagreed, ijrst noting that federal 
habeas was limited to a review of federal issues, typically 
federal constitutional issues, and does not extend to viola-
tions of state evidentiary rules. ld. at 72 ("Nor do our habeas 
powers allow us to reverse McGuire's conviction based on a 
belief that the trialjucjge incorrectly interpreted the 
California Evidence Code in ruling that the prior injury evi-
dence was admissible as bad acts evidence in this case."). 
See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 
6(1983) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the 
federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wis-
dom of state evidenti_ary rules."). 
Consequently, admission of the evidence had to be 
judged on due process grounds. The Court found the evi-
dence relevant and therefore did not have to determine 
whether the admission of irrelevant evidence violates due 
process. 502 U.S. at 70 ("Concluding, as we do, that the 
prior injury evidence was relevant to an issue in the case, 
we need not explore further the apparent assumption of the 
Court of Appeals that it is a violation of the due process 
[clause] ... for evidence that is not relevant to be received in 
a criminal trial."). 
McGuire also challenged the instruction, arguing that it 
permitted the jury to use propensity evidence in violation of 
due process. The Court disagreed with this interpretation of 
the instruction, finding that it did not violate the propensity 
rule. Rather, it presented an issue similar to an instruction 
on other-acts evidence under Federal Rule 404(b). The 
Court therefore had no reason to determine whether a 
propensity instruction would be unconstitutional. ld. at 75 n. 
5 ("Because we need not reach the issue, we express no 
opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due 
Process Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes' evi-
dence to show propensity to commit a charged crime."}. 
While unlikely in a routine case, the admissibility of other-
acts evidence may violate due process in a particularly 
egregious case. Cf. State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 338-
39, 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991)(evidence properly admitted 
under Evid. R. 404(B) did not violate due process), cert. dis-
missed, 506 U.S. 803 (1992). 
ENTRAPMENT CASES 
Ohio follows the majority rule on entrapment, sometimes 
known as the "origin of intent" test or subjective theory. See 
3 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law 
Ch 90 (1996)(entrapment). Under this test, entrapment oc-
curs ''when the criminal design originates with the officials of 
the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and in-
duce its commission in order that they may prosecute:' 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). See 
also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.25 (entrapment). 
Under this view of entrapment, the defendant's predispo-
sition (propensity) is a material issue, and the defendant's 
prior criminal conduct becomes relevant. As the United 
States Supreme Court has stated, "[l]f the defendant seeks 
acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an 
appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and 
predisposition as bearing upon that issue. If in conse-
quence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon 
himself by reason of the nature of the defense." Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932). 
Thus, an entrapment defense raises issues concerning 
the defendant's character and commission of other-acts. 
See 1 lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 
6.16 (1999) (affirmative defense of entrapment). Although 
tlie commentators disagree on the theory of admissibility, 
they do agree that the Federal Rules of Evidence have not 
changed the prior law on the subject. The use of disposition 
evidence in the entrapment context could be considered as 
raising an issue of (1) other-acts evidence under Rule 
404(8), (2) "character in issue," or (3) prosecution rebuttal to 
a defendant's raising a character issue under Rule 
404(A)(1 ). See 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure§ 5235, at 372-79 (1978). 
Nevertheless, this evidence rule has been characterized 
as the "greatest fault" of the subjective (origin-of-intent) ap-
proach and an "indiscriminate attitude toward predisposition 
evidence is by no means a necessary feature of the subjec-
tive test." Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn. L. 
Rev. 163, 272 (1976}. 
A similar caution is found in State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d 
187, 192,449 N.E.2d 1295 (1983}, where the Ohio 
Supreme Court expressed concern about the "scope of ad-
missible evidence on the issue of an accused's predisposi-
tion." The Court wrote: 
While evidence relevant to predisposition should be 
freely admitted, judges should be hesitant to allow evi-
dence of the accused's bad reputation, without more, 
on the issue of predisposition. Rather, while by no 
means an exhaustive list, the following matters would 
certainly be relevant on the issue of predisposition: (1) 
the accused's previous involvement in criminal activity 
of the nature charged, (2} the accused's ready acqui-
escence to the inducements offered by the police, (3} 
the accused's expert knowledge in the area of the 
criminal activity charged, (4) the accused's ready ac-
cess to contraband, and (5) the accused's willingness 
to involve himself in criminal activity. ld. at 192. 
These factors are not exhaustive. State v. Seebeck-
Horstman, 67 Ohio App.3d 443, 446, 587 N.E.2d 359 
(1990) (Doran factors are "by no means an exhaustive list"). 
Other factors include an accused's own admissions of past 
deeds or future plans, and the results of a police search 
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showing the defendant's involvement in a "course of ongo-
ing criminal activity." 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law§ 5.2(f)(1 ), at 607 ( 1986). 
Numerous Ohio cases address this evidence issue. E.g., 
State v. Smith, 92 Ohio App.3d 172, 176-78, 634 N.E.2d 
659 (1993) (applying the Doran factors); State v. Krivitskiy, 
70 Ohio App.3d 293,296-97,590 N.E.2d 1359 (1990); State 
v. Seebeck-Horstman, 67 Ohio App.3d 443, 445-46, 587 
N.E.2d 359 (1990} (applying the Doran factors); State v. 
Cheraso, 43 Ohio App.3d 221, 222, 540 N.E.2d 326 (1988) 
("Once [entrapment] is established, the state can rebut the 
entrapment defense by showing that the defendant was pre-
disposed to commit the crime."); Columbus v. Corne, 7 Ohio 
App.3d 344, 345-46, 455 N. E.2d 696 ( 1982) ("But, after the 
prosecution has rested its case and the defense of entrap-
ment is raised and pursued by the accused, then, the prose-
cution may introduce rebuttal evidence in an effort to show 
the accused's predisposition to commit the crime:'); State v. 
Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14, 437 N.E.2d 1202 (1980) (In 
an entrapment case, ''the defendant waives his right to pro-
hibit the state from showing his 'predisposition' and makes 
predisposition relevant for the state to show on rebuttal."). 
A number of other evidentiary issues surface in entrap-
ment cases. Although evidence of predisposition may be 
admissible, inadmissible hearsay evidence may not be used 
for this purpose. See United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 
346, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981 ). 
Expert Testimony 
Also, several courts have ruled that the defendant may in-
troduce expert testimony concerning his susceptibility to in-
ducement. See United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516-17 
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984}; State v. 
Woods, 20 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 3, 484 N.E.2d 773 (C.P.1984} 
("[The] defendant shall be permitted to introduce expert psy-
chiatric testimony as to any susceptibility to influence or 
suggestion as relevant to the predisposition issue .... The 
expert shall not however testify as to the actions of govern-
ment agents or their effect upon the defendant's susceptibili-
ty nor as to the ultimate issue of the existence of entrap-
ment which is within the province of the jury."). See also 
State v. Dapice, 57 Ohio App.3d 99, 105, 566 N.E.2d 1261 
(1989}("There is some authority that expert testimony on the 
issue of predisposition may be admitted .... However, admis-
sion of such testimony is a matter left to the discretion of the 
trial court."), appeal dismissed, 49 Ohio St.3d 707, 551 
N.E.2d 1301 (1990) . 
